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The Fiscal Objection to  
Social Welfare Rights: A Closer Look
AMIR PAZ-FUCHS*
I. INTRODUCTION
THOUGH IT HAS been repeatedly asserted that theoretical arguments against recognition of social welfare (SW) rights have been effectively answered,1 they tend to resurface in implicit fashion in legal doctrine. This chapter argues that at 
the core of contemporary manifestations of the traditional objections to SW rights is 
their unique relationship with money. The chapter sheds light on the structure of the 
current version of the old objections by reviewing judicial rulings in courts in general 
and in Israeli courts in the fields of health, education and welfare in particular. Focusing 
on this one particular justification – that objections to social and economic rights col-
lapse into reservations regarding judicial abilities to deal with fiscal issues – carries the 
potential to highlight the ambiguities and inconsistencies in the judgments and in the 
arguments that underlie them. 
But before doing so, some preliminaries must be addressed. First, as always: terminol-
ogy. But in this case, terminology is also substantive. Scholars writing on the theoretical 
and pragmatic objections to judicial enforcement of rights to education, health, housing 
and the like, tend to use the term ‘social and economic rights’.2 This chapter, however, 
will follow the lead suggested by Mark Tushnet and use the term ‘social welfare rights’.3 
As Herman Schwartz and others have recently noted, ‘the central issue is not really 
about social and economic rights, but primarily about social rights. More precisely, it is 
* I would like to thank Mark Tushnet, Aeyal Gross, Neta Ziv and other participants in the conference for 
thoughtful and helpful comments. Unless otherwise stated, all translations are mine.
1 J Waldron, ‘Introduction’ in J Waldron (ed), Theories of  Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1984) 1, 
11.
2 There are good reasons for doing so. After all, international documents bind social and economic rights 
together. See, eg International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3; UN Commission on Human Rights, Note verbale 
dated 5 December 1986 from the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to the United Nations Office at 
Geneva addressed to the Centre for Human Rights (‘Limburg Principles’) (8 January 1987) UN Doc E/
CN4/1987/17; Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (22–26 January 
1997).
3 M Tushnet, ‘Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review’ (2004) 82 Texas Law Review 1895, 
1895.
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about social and certain economic rights’.4 The reason for excluding paradigmatic eco-
nomic rights such as property and contract from this discussion lies not only in the fact 
that there is little controversy over the legitimacy of their judicial enforcement, but also 
because judicial deference to economic rights such as property and contract conflicts 
with the redistributive interests that lie at the heart of social welfare rights.5
The second preliminary note comes in the form of a qualification: the chapter does not 
seek to confront the issue that has occupied many American constitutional scholars, to 
wit: whether social and economic rights belong in a constitution.6 The normative focus of 
this chapter, with its affinities to legal realism, agrees that ‘there is no reason to think that 
it is the constitutionalization of these rights that is crucial’.7 Courts may have profound 
impact on social policies without resorting to judicial review of legislation. First, because 
a significant amount of policy decisions, on the micro and macro level, are made at the 
sub-legislative, administrative, level.8 Second, even where legislation is involved, courts 
can enforce rights through other methods, such as the interpretation of statutes.9
Turning to the substantive focus of the chapter, it is necessary to ask: what is the 
advantage of analyzing the judicial enforcement of social and economic rights through 
the perspective of money? The fact that the perspective has largely been swept away as 
‘an offense to polite manners’10 is a good enough reason to finally do so. But it is far 
more than that. One may say that the same, well-worn theoretical objections to SW 
rights that were, as noted, effectively answered, are being redressed in fiscal clothes. 
Three such objections are noted: first, that the judicial enforcement of SW rights endan-
gers proper separation of powers; second, that the courts lack the expertise and compe-
tence to deal with the complex issues that SW rights raise; and third, that vexing 
enforcement problems related to SW rights will reflect poorly on rights in general, and 
will endanger respect for first generation, civil and political (CP) rights. Now, while 
these objections were formulated, at first, in a straightforward fashion, today they 
almost always seek reinforcement from one or more of the usual concepts: budget, fund-
ing, resources, and the like. But, of course, the substantive rebuttal to the objections still 
remains, and should be articulated. 
4 H Schwartz, ‘Do Economic and Social Rights Belong in a Constitution?’ (1995) 10 American University 
Journal of  International Law and Policy 1233, 1235; also D Barak-Erez and A Gross, ‘Social Rights and the 
Struggle for Social Citizenship’ in S Almog and Y Rotem (eds), Dorner Book (Srigim, Nevo, 2009) 189, 190.
5 M Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative 
Constitutional Law (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2008) 170–94. For the impact of social welfare 
rights on redistribution, see D Barak-Erez and A Gross, ‘Introduction: Do We Need Social Rights – Questions 
in the Era of Globalization, Privatization and the Diminished Welfare State’ in D Barak-Erez and A Gross 
(eds), Exploring Social Rights: Between Theory and Practice (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007) 1, 16.
6 F Michelman, ‘The Constitution, Social Rights and Liberal Political Justification’ in Barak-Erez and 
Gross, Exploring Social Rights (n 5) 21; C Fabre, Social Rights Under the Constitution (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2000); H Schwartz, ‘Economic and Social Rights’ (1993) 8 American University Journal of  
International Law and Policy 551.
7 Schwartz, ‘Economic and Social Rights’ (n 4) 1243.
8 R Titmuss, ‘Welfare “Rights”, Law and Discretion’ (1971) 42 The Political Quarterly 113, 120–21, 124 
(‘public assistance in the United States is almost entirely discretionary’); M Diller, ‘The Revolution in Welfare 
Administration: Rules, Discretion and Entrepreneurial Government’ (2000) 75 New York University Law 
Review 1121, 1147; J Handler, ‘Discretion in Social Welfare: The Uneasy Position in the Rule of Law’ (1983) 92 
Yale Law Journal 1270, 1276; D Barak-Erez, ‘The Israeli Welfare State – Between Legislation and Bureaucracy‘ 
(2002) 9 Labor, Society and Law 175, 177–78 (in Hebrew).
9 Tushnet, ‘Social Welfare Rights’ (n 3) 1898; Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights (n 5) 224.
10 S Holmes and C Sunstein, The Cost of  Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes (New York, WW Norton, 
1999) 24.
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In what follows, I will briefly outline the three arguments, show each one’s modern 
association with budgetary concerns, and note some instances that reveal how this asso-
ciation was expressed in Israeli case law. Part II will discuss the argument concerning 
separation of powers; part III will focus on the argument concerning the courts’ compe-
tency to deal with SW rights; and part IV will discuss the objection to SW that is con-
cerned with lack of applicability and the impact that ‘futile’ efforts to implement SW 
rights supposedly has on ‘real’ (ie CP) rights. I then turn, in part V, to a focused rebuttal 
of the fiscal objection. The chapter concludes, in part VI, with a suggestion as to why 
this particular objection has remained so attractive to courts and to scholars alike. I 
believe that the latter analysis suggests a theoretical reconstruction that has implications 
not only to the subject at hand, but also to the way SW rights, and rights in general, are 
reconstructed in contemporary judicial discourse. 
II. SEPARATION OF POWERS
According to this argument, the judiciary should refrain from enforcing SW rights 
because acting otherwise would require the courts to adjudicate policies, priorities and, 
ultimately – to distribute and redistribute funds. Such a result is tantamount to the 
unconstitutional, illegitimate and undemocratic transfer of authority from Parliament 
and government to the courts.11 Timothy Macklem’s exposition of the argument reveals 
its strong ties to matters of resources and funding. He argues that allowing the courts 
power to enforce social welfare rights would grant them the role to decide 
the level of funding that health care should receive from the government, and . . . how that 
funding should be distributed . . . It would be for the courts to set the direction for the econ-
omy, to establish the curriculum for the schools, to determine environmental policy – in short, 
to govern. Clearly this would be undesirable, for it would have the effect of transferring virtu-
ally all democratic authority from the people’s present representatives . . . to the courts whose 
duty it is to interpret and enforce that Constitution.12
Frank Cross drives the point home, employing the timeless phrase and stating that 
‘courts understand that requiring legislatures to provide minimal levels of subsistence 
for all Americans encroaches upon the jealously guarded “power of the purse”’.13 This, 
indeed, fits well with the US Supreme Court’s self-awareness, remarking as it did that 
‘the intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by public 
welfare assistance programs are not the business of this Court’.14
Across the ocean, the House of Lords has been characterised as holding ‘a deeply 
embedded judicial conviction that matters of public finance are the preserve of the 
elected branches of government and not of courts’.15 And the Irish Supreme Court con-
cluded that ‘it is not the function of the courts to make an assessment of the validity of 
the many competing claims on national resources’.16 
11 See the discussion in G Davidov, ‘Constitutional Review of Budgetary Matters’ (2007) 49 The Lawyer 345, 
348–49 (in Hebrew).
12 T Macklem, ‘Vriend v Alberta: Making the Private Public’ (1999) 44 McGill Law Journal 197, 210.
13 F Cross, ‘The Error of Positive Rights’ (2001) 48 UCLA Law Review 857, 890.
14 Dandridge v Williams 397 US 471, 487 (1970); Mathews v Eldridge 424 US 319, 348 (1976).
15 ED Palmer, ‘Resource Allocation, Welfare Rights’ (2000) 20 OJLS 63, 74.
16 TD v Minister for Education [2001] 4 IR 259 (Ir).
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And yet, on a normative level, it is simply not true that the courts can refrain from 
intervening in questions of distribution and redistribution. Not intervening, in such 
cases, would usually mean embracing the highly controversial baseline of the market, or 
even accepting the economic status quo that, in itself, depends on public institutions and 
state action.17 The decision not to alter the ‘background rules’ that inform the current 
social and economic state of affairs is a decision in its own right. Even the distinction 
between ‘commission’ and ‘omission’ is not relevant in this case. For, in constitutional 
democracies, courts quite often protected rights to property and contract, at the expense 
of other social and legal interests (the Lochner era being an obvious example).18 In 
Professor Tushnet’s words: ‘The state is complicit in creating the distribution of wealth 
in society whether it “acts” affirmatively or whether it does nothing but enforce the 
background rules of property and contract law’.19 
However, as shown by the example of Israeli health policy, the courts tend to accept the 
bond between fiscal considerations and the threat to separation of powers. Some back-
ground is warranted: the National Health Insurance Law, 5754-1994, establishes a basket 
of health services to which citizens are entitled, and the process for updating the basket. 
The Law grants the Ministers of Health and Finance the power to update the basket, fol-
lowing a recommendation by the Health Council.20 In Maccabi Health Services v Minister 
of Finance,21 the health fund challenged the Minister’s refusal to update the health index, 
despite a unanimous recommendation to that effect by the Health Council, which was but-
tressed by a similar assertion by a parliamentary committee of enquiry. The Minister rec-
ognised the objective need to update the health index, but replied that budgetary constraints 
restrained him from acting accordingly. 
The Israeli Supreme Court (ISC) dismissed this argument, mocking it as an attempt to 
devise a new theory of ubi remedium ibi jus – where there is a remedy there is a right22 
– instead of the other way around. The Court clarifies that where a statutory obligation 
is recognised, the state cannot argue that fiscal resources prevent it from living up to its 
duties. The Court also noted that ignoring the Health Council’s opinion, undermines the 
Council’s statutory standing as an expert advisor in the process.23 However, after all this 
17 A Sen, Inequality Reexamined (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992) 1–100; Holmes and Sunstein (n 10) 61.
18 Lochner v New York 198 US 45, 45 (1905) (striking down a New York law that limited the work day to 10 
hours, and the work week to 60 hours, for being an ‘unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with 
the right and liberty of the individual to contract’); Adkins v Children’s Hospital 261 US 525 (1923) (striking 
down a law providing minimum wages for women and children); Adair v United States 208 US 161 (1908) 
(upholding ‘yellow dog’ contracts that forbid workers from joining unions); Tyson & Brother v Banton 273 US 
418 (1927) (striking down a law regulating the price of theatre tickets); Weaver v Palmer Bro Co 270 US 402 
(1926) (striking down a public health and safety regulation concerning the use of fabrics as a violation of the 
due process clause). See C Sunstein, ‘Lochner’s Legacy’ (1987) 87 Columbia Law Review 873, 883 (arguing that 
the ‘central problem of the Lochner Court had to do with its conceptions of neutrality and inaction and its 
choice of appropriate baseline’).
19 Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights (n 5) 189; for Tushnet’s own discussion of the Lochner era see ibid 
172–74.
20 The Health Council is chaired by the Minister of Health, and consists of 46 members from government 
ministries, health funds, Israel Medical Association, academia, trade unions, employers and municipalities – 
National Health Insurance Law, 5754-1994, s 49.
21 HCJ 2344/98 Maccabi Healthcare Services v Minister of  Finance 54(5) PD 729 [2000] (in Hebrew).
22 See also Holmes and Sunstein (n 10) 43 (explaining that individuals enjoy rights in a legal, as opposed to 
a moral, sense, ‘only if the wrongs they suffer are fairly and predictably redressed by their government’).
23 Maccabi (n 21) 761–62.
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‘lofty talk’,24 the Court concluded that it cannot order the Government to spend the 
sums that would result from accepting the petition: ‘We have never instructed the state 
to pay anyone out of its budget amounts of such magnitude as those that the health 
funds are asking for in the present matter’.25
III. COMPETENCE
Critiques of judicial enforcement of SW rights suggest that the courts, which hear cases 
on an individual basis, are not equipped to deal with issues that require a broader view. 
Moreover, the complex nature of social and economic issues bars the courts from truly 
assessing the whole environment from which the case stems and which is affected by the 
decision.26 
Continuing the analysis of the judicial role with respect to Israeli health policy, Chinitz 
and Shalev note that ‘It is not surprising that the Court is hesitant to intervene in such 
technical and obscure fiscal matters . . . The Court is not necessarily well equipped to 
deal with accounting’.27 Moreover, even appeals to courts to overturn health fund deci-
sions are ‘unlikely to succeed, unless the letter of the law has been ignored. The courts 
acknowledge budgetary constraints and accept standards of evidence-based medicine as 
benchmarks for public funding’.28
However, as the Maccabi case, described above, suggests, it is often the political deci-
sion that is not based on ‘evidence-based medicine’, while the judicial one may rely on 
substantial expert opinion (such as that of the Health Council, in that case). Even then, 
extreme judicial restraint is observed. 
Though courts should not be dismissive of the fact that the individual case they are 
addressing may have repercussions for others whose claim is not heard, it should also be 
recalled that courts deal, on a daily basis, with intricate economic problems that have 
serious ramifications in trade, business, monopolies, taxes, and similar realms. This is 
done, of course, with no qualms regarding competence.29 Moreover, an institutional 
analysis of legislatures and courts reveals no important differences regarding the pres-
sures to which they are subject, the considerations they take into account and the level of 
generality they aim for.30 An analysis of post-Communist socio-legal developments sug-
gests that even where constitutional courts intervened in a manner that moderated the 
transition to market economies, no ‘disaster’ has come to pass, despite warnings to that 
effect.31 Moreover, in some cases (such as Hungary) the transition may have been 
improved by the Constitutional Court’s oversight and regulation. The charge that the 
24 ibid 750–51; see also D Chinitz and C Shalev, ‘Joe Public v The General Public: The Role of the Courts in 
Israeli Health Care Policy’ (2005) 33 Journal of  Law, Medicine & Ethics 650, 654.
25 Maccabi (n 21) 752.
26 See Holmes and Sunstein (n 10) 18–19.
27 Chinitz and Shalev (n 24) 653.
28 ibid 655.
29 F Michelman, ‘In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls’ Theory of Justice’ (1973) 
121 Pennsylvania Law Review 962, 1006.
30 J Deutsch, ‘Neutrality, Legitimacy and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections between Law and Political 
Science’ (1968) 20 Stanford Law Review 169, 183–84.
31 KL Scheppele, ‘A Realpolitik Defense of Social Rights’ (2004) 82 Texas Law Review 1921, 1948; Tushnet, 
Weak Courts, Strong Rights (n 5) 235–36.
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court lacks expertise to deal with social and economic issues, therefore, seems to rely 
on shaky evidence. The conclusion should be that even where budgetary issues are 
concerned, the court’s particular expertise justifies expanding ‘the normal conception of 
the role of the courts in a democratic society to include the role of “policy partner” in 
ongoing bargaining about how a state should use its scarce resources’.32 
A more nuanced rebuttal to this objection stems from the fact that not all reviews of 
social policies are alike. An important distinction should be made at the level of remedy, 
between demands that the court itself erects a policy or programme, on the one hand, 
and charges to administer the policy in a fair and equal fashion, on the other hand.33 An 
example of the latter case is the Canadian Government’s refusal to provide sign lan-
guage interpreters to deaf patients on the basis that it would put a ‘severe strain on the 
fiscal sustainability of the health care system’.34 The Court reasoned that ‘The Legislature, 
upon defining its objective as guaranteeing access to a range of medical services, cannot 
evade its obligations . . . to provide those services without discrimination by appointing 
hospitals to carry out that objective’.35 The Court may well be hesitant to dictate the 
erection of a particular medical service, but once the Government decided to enter the 
field, ‘it must provide all the services within the genre’36 to all the relevant recipients. We 
find, once again, that the ability to link such SW challenges to the duty to treat all citi-
zens with equal concern and respect increases their appeal.37 
And yet, while this approach seems quite appealing, it also raises a particular difficulty: 
the fact that court decisions that give effect to SW rights are deemed justifiable only when 
a given policy is in effect suggests that it is the principle of non-discrimination, rather than 
social and economic rights, that is doing ‘the work’. The result is twofold: first, as a prin-
cipled matter, rather than undermining the ‘liberal’ (in the European sense) tendencies of 
the courts, this approach reveals a willingness to entertain SW challenges only when they 
can be broken down to an individual’s (preferably – nameable individual’s) interests, but 
not when they are presented as collective harms, however ill-conceived, unprofessional 
and harmful to constitutional rights. Secondly, the concrete effects of the approach are 
noticeable, insofar as the remedy is concerned: instead of a generalised (or even generaliz-
able) injunction, the court will solve a particular problem for a particular individual. In 
doing so, it will also praise the importance of SW rights, and mock the irrelevance of bud-
getary concerns, which will be relatively minimal in the case at hand. We find, then, that 
this approach does not only trace the limits of the ability to challenge social and economic 
policies in a successful manner (ie when discrimination is established). It also reinforces, 
rather than undermines, the traditional objection to the court’s ability to reach decisions 
that have complex, and perhaps unpredictable, consequences, an objection that is espe-
cially visible where SW rights are concerned.
A few Israeli cases from the field of education seem particularly relevant: in Botzer, 
the ISC ruled that a school must make the necessary physical arrangements to grant a 
32 Scheppele (n 31) 1935.
33 Davidov (n 11) 351.
34 Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General) [1997] 3 SCR 624 (Can).
35 ibid para 51; see Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights (n 5) 205 (asserting that, under Eldridge, once a 
government decides to provide some social welfare services, it must do so without discrimination).
36 ibid (n 5) 205.
37 See, eg D Barak-Erez and A Gross, ‘Social Citizenship: The Neglected Aspect of Israeli Constitutional 
Law’ in Barak-Erez and Gross, Exploring Social Rights (n 5) 243, 252–53; F Michelman, ‘Foreword: On 
Protecting the Poor through the Fourteenth Amendment’ (1969) 83 Harvard Law Review 7, 11.
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child who suffers from multiple sclerosis and is bound to a wheelchair, easy access to 
and from his classroom.38 The Court did not miss the opportunity to assert that ‘ensur-
ing equal opportunity . . . costs money’ and that the constitutional right to dignity 
includes the right to equal opportunities in education.39 Needless to say, the judgment 
did not require all schools in Israel to make similar modifications to allow children with 
disabilities to be integrated in the general school system. Indeed, the very same year the 
ISC rejected a petition that challenged a ministerial (and not statutory) budgetary deci-
sion to cut a programme that assists the children suffering from environmental dis-
advantage and helps them integrate, socially and intellectually, into the general school 
system.40 The Court distinguished its decision from Botzer, stating that ‘the principle of 
equal opportunity does not stand alone. It cannot be severed from the general social 
context. The realization of the principle requires resource allocation. The financial abil-
ity of the government authority should be balanced against the needs’.41 
A similar fate was in store for a petition to force the Ministry to apply provisions of 
the Special Education Law 5748-1988 that require the integration of children with 
special needs in the general education system to children aged three to four.42 In a brief 
judgment, the Court acknowledged that the professional consensus is that the integra-
tion of children with disabilities enhances their social and intellectual ability, and that 
time is of critical importance.43 But it rejected the charge, stating that the limited budget-
ary abilities require prioritization, and that is left to the Government.44 Such budgetary 
considerations were left irrelevant when the ISC considered a demand that a municipal-
ity shoulder the costs of transferring a child who suffered severe social problems in her 
original school.45 The ISC relied on the constitutional right to education that should be 
supplied free of charge, including in cases where particular solutions are necessary.
A pattern emerges: when a general social problem is laid down for the court, budget-
ary concerns are raised. When a very similar social issue (eg integration of children into 
schools) is broken down – the court is much more receptive. As Tushnet’s summary of 
Irish cases reveals, the same pattern is observed in other countries.46
IV. APPLICABILITY AND SPILLOVER EFFECTS
This argument suggests that, because of their budgetary implications, SW rights simply 
cannot be enforced. It would seem surprising to find a court stating such a rationale 
explicitly and, indeed, no such sentiment appears in ISC (or other court’s) judgments 
that I am aware of. However, the centrality of this argument as a wedge to distinguish 
38 HCJ 7081/93 Botzer v Municipal Council of  Maccabim-Reut 50(1) PD 19 [1996] (in Hebrew).
39 ibid para 27.
40 HCJ 1554/95 Shoharei Gilat Society v Minister of  Education 50(3) PD 2 [1996] (in Hebrew).
41 ibid para 41.
42 HCJ 5597/07 Alut – The National Association for Children with Autism v Minister of  Education (21 
August 2007), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (in Hebrew).
43 ibid para 4.
44 ibid para 6.
45 HCJ 7374/01 John Does v Director of  the Ministry of  Education (10 September 2003), Nevo Legal 
Database (by subscription) (in Hebrew).
46 Tushnet, ‘Social Welfare Rights’ (n 3) 1899–1900.
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CP from SW rights in academic writings,47 and its strong relation to budgetary concerns, 
merits some discussion here.
Frank Cross explains that courts ‘avoid involving themselves in matters fundamental 
to the enforcement of positive rights’.48 The argument is very similar to that of Maurice 
Cranston’s, almost 50 years ago.49 Though they do not state the argument explicitly in 
these terms, it can be understood from the thrust of Cranston’s and Cross’s argument, 
that the recognition of one type of right (social or economic) to which one cannot give 
effect may lead to a derogation of the status of rights in general and to the state’s com-
mitment to the protection of rights.
Cass Sunstein articulated this concern, stating that
[i]f positive rights are not enforceable, the constitution itself may seem like a mere piece of 
paper; there could be adverse consequences for other rights as well . . . the existence of unen-
forceable rights will in turn tend to destroy the negative rights – freedom of speech, freedom of 
religion, and so forth – that might otherwise be genuine ones. If some rights are shown to be 
unenforceable, it is likely that other rights will be unenforceable as well.50 
But this worry seems to rest on the fallacious assumption that if a right is recognised, 
it should always trump other interests. However, there is no reason to assume that advo-
cates of the right assume that it is an absolute one, or that the state is under a duty to 
invest all its resources in one right or another. As Joseph Raz notes, the tendency to 
portray support for certain rights as espousing a position in favour of absolute rights 
amounts to a ‘simple mistake’ which is more common than what would be expected:
The fact that a given right can be overridden by moral considerations, just like the fact that it 
can be overridden by another legal right, shows nothing except that it is not an absolute right 
which defeats all contrary considerations.51 
Of course, if a full realization of the right to health and education would require that 
everyone be able to enjoy free comprehensive health services on demand and free educa-
tion to her heart’s content, it may well be that no country will ever have the financial 
capabilities necessary to hold up to such a standard. This does not imply, however, that 
within the domestic legal system these rights carry no weight, and surely does not 
demand the conclusion that they are not rights at all. Despite attempts to dismiss rights 
that correspond to ‘imperfect obligations’ (used here to refer to obligations that cannot 
be addressed in full),52 the feasibility of enforcement of rights is not a criterion (or at 
least not an overwhelming criterion) when dealing with the question of recognition of 
rights. Since rights cost money, the decision to realise civil and political rights by polic-
ing political demonstrations that people find offensive, for example, may divert funds 
47 See, eg Y Dotan, ‘The Supreme Court as Defender of Social Rights’ in Y Rabin and Y Shani (eds), 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Israel (Tel-Aviv, Ramot, 2004) 69, 88–97.
48 Cross, ‘The Error of Positive Rights’ (2001) (n 13) 889, 904–05.
49 M Cranston, ‘Human Rights, Real and Supposed’ in DD Raphael (ed), Political Theory and the Rights of  
Man (Indiana, Indiana University Press, 1967) 50.
50 C Sunstein, ‘Against Positive Rights’ in A Sajo (ed), Western Rights, Postcommunist Application (Hogue, 
Kluwer Law International, 1996) 225, 229. For a similar argument, see LW Sumner, The Moral Foundations of  
Rights (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989) 15; R Epstein, ‘Classical Liberalism Meets the New Constitutional 
Order: A Comment on Mark Tushnet’ (2002) 3 Chicago Journal of  International Law 455, 464.
51 J Raz, ‘Legal Rights’ (1984) 4 OJLS 1, 19; Holmes and Sunstein also acknowledge this truism (n 10) 97.
52 R Epstein, ‘The Uncertain Quest for Welfare Rights’ (1985) Brigham Young University Law Review 201, 
204.
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away from building hospitals. Such a decision, in other words, is a political and not a 
conceptual one.53
V. THE FISCAL OBJECTION REVEALED AND DISCUSSED
In the discussion above, I briefly addressed each of the objections noted above in their 
new, ‘fiscal’, dressing. However, as noted, all these arguments collapse, in their contem-
porary versions, into objections that have money at the centre of their interest.54 
Further evidence that the arguments discussed are strongly linked to fiscal constraints 
in contemporary discourse is revealed in the negative. In the (justifiably) celebrated 
South African Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) case,55 the Constitutional Court 
ordered the Government to distribute a drug, Nevirapine, that reduces the transmission 
of HIV/AIDS from pregnant mothers to children. The interesting point, for present pur-
poses, is that the drug’s manufacturer was willing to supply as much as was needed at no 
cost.
TAC presented a complex case that required proper professional and bureaucratic 
expertise, where it could be expected that bona fide questions of competence could be 
raised. This matter was indeed acknowledged by the South African Constitutional 
Court.56 And yet, instead of deferring to the Government’s discretion, the Constitutional 
Court addressed and dismissed the relevant arguments (efficacy, safety, biomedical 
resistance, cultural reservations to bottle feeding, absence of clean water) one by one.57 
Similarly, the Constitutional Court rejected the Government’s position that it is not in a 
position to distribute the drug across the country as ‘not relevant to the question’ at 
hand.58 The reason for such an outright rejection of the Government’s arguments in such 
a complex case seems clear. Where the fiscal impact of compliance is small, the norma-
tive objections seem to wither away.59 What made the decision ‘a relatively easy one for 
the Court’, argues Denis Davis, was the lack of ‘any sustainable argument concerning 
distributional questions’.60 Indeed, when the ISC discussed a parallel case, the ISC distin-
guished the matter from TAC by noting (and emphasizing) that, in the latter case, ‘the 
drug was distributed free of charge’.61
It makes sense, therefore, to focus on the argument that the fact that enforcement of 
SW rights requires public funds is, in and of itself, sufficient to bar them from judicial 
enforcement. 
The surprisingly trivial refutation of this argument is that while SW rights do indeed 
require funds, they are not unique in doing so.62 However, where CP rights (including 
53 R Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (London, Harvard University Press, 2000) 137.
54 J Kuthari, ‘Social Rights Litigation in India’ in Barak-Erez and Gross, Exploring Social Rights (n 5) 171, 
174.
55 Minister of  Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (10) BCLR 1075 (CC) (S Afr).
56 ibid para 38. 
57 ibid paras 56–64.
58 ibid paras 65–66.
59 See also, Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights (n 5) 247.
60 D Davis, ‘Socio-Economic Rights: The Promise and Limitations: The South African Experience’ in Barak-
Erez and Gross, Exploring Social Rights (n 5) 193, 199.
61 HCJ 3071/05 Louzon v Government of  Israel (28 July 2008), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) para 
12 (in Hebrew).
62 See, eg Michelman, ‘The Constitution’ (n 6) 24; Davidov (n 11) 354–55.
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equality) are concerned, the courts are quite impatient with such arguments. Thus, the 
Canadian Supreme Court accepted a claim that a benefit policy was discriminatory, and 
was undeterred by the fiscal implications, noting that ‘any remedy granted by a court 
will have some budgetary repercussions whether it be a saving of money or an expendi-
ture of money’.63 And in Singh,64 the same Court rejected the Government’s position that 
refugees can be denied an oral hearing because of the unreasonable budgetary burden 
that granting such a right would entail.65 Similarly, the South African Constitutional 
Court ruled that prisoners may not be denied the right to vote, even though granting 
them such rights may have serious logistic and financial implications.66
In Israel, the Supreme Court stated that it is ‘natural’ that implementing equality (in 
this case – to women in the air force) would have financial consequences.67 In fact, where 
equality is concerned, the ISC repeated the simple statement that ‘human rights cost 
money’ on several occasions: when accepting the charge that forcing airline cabin atten-
dants to retire at 60 constitutes age discrimination;68 when accepting the claim that dif-
ferent early retirement arrangements for men and women cannot be justified by 
budgetary concerns;69 when stating that such concerns cannot justify discrimination 
between groups entitled to benefits and subsidies;70 when ordering a deeper drill for a 
pipe line to avoid harming graves, at the cost of 500,000 NIS (New Israeli Shekel);71 and 
when striking down a law that permits holding accused soldiers for extensive periods 
before seeing a judge.72 
As trivial as this seems, a testament to the power of the original argument discussed in 
this part is the fact that two prominent constitutional scholars, Stephen Holmes and Cass 
Sunstein, dedicated a book to refuting it. The main argument in The Cost of Rights73 is 
clearly stated in the introduction:
To the obvious truth that rights depend on government must be added a logical corollary, one 
rich with implications: rights cost money . . . The right to freedom of contract has public costs 
no less than the right to health care, the right to freedom of speech no less than the right to 
decent housing. All rights make claims upon the public treasury.74
Contemporary antagonists of SW rights have understood the force of this reply, and 
have revised their position, arguing that the distinction between SW rights and tradi-
63 Schachter v Canada [1992] 2 SCR 679, 709 (Can).
64 Singh v Minister of  Employment and Immigration [1985] 1 SCR 177 (Can).
65 ibid para 70.
66 Minister of  Home Affairs v NICRO 2004 (5) BCLR 445 (CC) para 48 (S Afr) (‘Resources cannot be 
ignored in assessing whether reasonable arrangements have been made for enabling citizens to vote. There is a 
difference, however, between a decision by Parliament or the Commission as to what is reasonable in that 
regard and legislation that effectively disenfranchises a category of citizens’).
67 HCJ 4541/94 Miller v Minister of  Defence 49(4) PD 94, 142 [1995] (in Hebrew).
68 HCJFH 4191/97 Recanat v National Labour Court 54(5) PD 330, 366 [2000] (in Hebrew).
69 HCJ 6845/00 Niv v National Labour Court 56(6) PD 663, 697 [2002] (in Hebrew) (‘we find it difficult to 
understand how budgetary considerations could justify discrimination of women’).
70 HCJ 5496/97 Mardi v Minister of  Agriculture 55(4) PD 540, 568 [2001] (in Hebrew) (even when the budget 
for the relevant needs has been spent in its entirety, ‘remedying discrimination . . . might cost money . . . [and 
there is] an obligation to find the way to pay the necessary sums’).
71 HCJ 4638/07 Al-Aktza Almobarak Company Ltd v Israel Electric Co (29 October 2007), Nevo Legal 
Database (by subscription) para 11 (in Hebrew).
72 HCJ 6055/95 Zemach v Minister of  Defence 53(5) PD 241, 281 [1997] (in Hebrew) (‘defending human rights 
often has costs’).
73 Holmes and Sunstein (n 10).
74 ibid 15.
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tional, CP rights, is one of quantity, not quality. In other words, it is indeed true that 
both ‘types’ cost money, but the degree of SW expenditure is of such a different magni-
tude that it demands a conceptually different treatment.75 This position, positively noted 
by the ISC,76 suggests that, because SW rights require massive distributions of funds, 
they raise questions of competence and democratic legitimacy in a way that minor 
expenditures that result from decisions concerning CP rights do not. There are two dif-
ferent responses to this renewed version of the traditional argument. The first relates to 
the above discussion, concerning the importance of the remedy sought when assessing 
the legal challenge.77 The reason that the remedy comes to the fore is that, since almost 
all modern nations have in place governmental health care, education, subsistence sup-
port and similar programmes, demands that the court institute a new social programme 
‘from scratch’ are extremely rare.78 Much more common – and potentially costly – are 
demands that existing social policies should not discriminate against defined groups 
(women, single parents, single sex couples, immigrants, etc). And yet, even those advanc-
ing the objection under review do not suggest that the courts should refrain from scruti-
nizing claims of discrimination, even against the background of SW policy.79
A second response to this objection takes it at face value: even if there is a clear way of 
distinguishing CP claims from SW claims (as was made clear, at least equality blurs the 
line), the argument relies on empirical evidence that is not offered. In fact, there may 
well be evidence to the contrary. The Costs of Rights, in fact, includes an appendix 
entitled ‘Some Numbers on Rights and Their Costs’,80 exemplifying the astounding cost 
of CP rights enforcement in the US. For example, the Federal prison system costs $2.465 
billion; the Federal court system costs almost $1.5 billion; the joint cost of animal and 
plan inspection and food and safety inspection is close to $1 billion; Defence Department 
obligations exceed $20 billion; environmental protection (clear air, hazardous waste, 
natural resources, and water quality) costs over $1.3 billion; and Census Bureau activi-
ties, government publications, postal services and national archives cost over $500 
million. 
In Israel, several cases can be noted to make the same point. While finding that the 
‘Gaza Disengagement plan’ is constitutional, the ISC struck down four compensation 
mechanisms to (former) settlers in the region.81 A senior Ministry of Finance official esti-
mated the cost of the judgment at 500 million NIS, raising the total cost to 7.5 billion NIS,82 
while a subsequent report issued by the Knesset (Israeli Parliament) Research and 
Information Center assessed the cost of the judgment at 10.8 billion NIS (about $3 billion).83 
Following the Disengagement, the ISC did not hesitate ordering the Government to 
75 Tushnet, ‘Social Welfare Rights’ (n 4) 1896; M Cohen-Eliya, ‘The Blues, the Reds, and the Judge in Between: 
A Procedural Approach with Bites for Judicial Review on Social Rights’ (2009) 12 Law and Government 407, 
410–15, 420–21 (in Hebrew).
76 Louzon (n 61) para 10.
77 Text to nn 33–37.
78 Schwartz, ‘Economic and Social Rights’ (n 4) 1238.
79 Cohen-Eliya (n 75) 429.
80 Holmes and Sunstein (n 10) 233–36.
81 HCJ 1661/05 Hof  Aza Regional Council v Knesset 59(2) PD 481 [2005] (in Hebrew).
82 Z Klein, ‘Haber: The HCJ Judgment will increase the cost of the Disengagement Plan by 500 million 
NIS’, Globes, Rishon-Lezion, 16 June 2005 (in Hebrew) www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=924114.
83 I Biton, ‘The Disengagement Plan from the Gaza Strip and Areas in Northern Samaria’ Knesset Research 
and Information Center (31 January 2010) (in Hebrew), available at: www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/pdf/
m02539.pdf.
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complete the necessary defence for classrooms in the Gaza vicinity, despite warnings that 
the costs would reach ‘hundreds of millions of NIS in the short run, and probably several 
billion NIS in the long run’.84 The overall cost of the ISC’s orders to dismantle (and 
re-erect) certain segments of the separation barrier85 is estimated at 1.5 billion NIS ($416 
million).86 The ISC’s unprecedented decision to strike down a law that would authorise 
the establishment of a private prison87 has been estimated to cost the tax payer up to 637 
million NIS ($177 million).88
Another case merits particular mention, as it combines exceptional, clear financial 
consequences with the Court’s refusal to give them any consideration. In addition, the 
case manifests the Court’s complete disregard of the Government’s legitimate priorities 
and rationales. In the case, Dan Area Revenue Service v Perry,89 the ISC denied an appeal 
on the Tel-Aviv District Court’s decision, according to which child care should be recog-
nised as exemptions for tax purposes. The decision was made despite the Ministry of 
Finance’s assertion that it would cost the public treasury over 3 billion NIS ($900 mil-
lion) per year.90 Where the tax interests of successful lawyers are concerned, it would 
seem, fiscal concerns lose their appeal.
When SW claims appear before the Court, particularly in their ‘naked’ form which 
highlights the fiscal aspect, the Court’s worst fears are met with an unmitigated reply. In 
Manor91 and in Commitment to Peace92 claims were made that social benefit cuts (to old 
age pensions and to subsistence benefits, respectively) infringe an impoverished individ-
ual’s ability to a life of dignity and undermine the right to social security.93 In light of the 
above, the fact that the Court ruled against the claimants is not surprising.
The surprise, or disappointment, stems from ISC’s logic, which is a testament to its 
complete deference to government fiscal policy. The Israeli constitutional method that 
has developed over the past two decades involves a three-stage analysis.94 First, the court 
assesses whether a constitutional right has been violated. If so, it continues to assess 
whether the infringement is by law, proportionate to the benefit, and cannot be achieved 
by less harmful means. The third stage involves a discussion of the constitutional rem-
edy, if necessary.
In the vast majority of cases, the court is very lenient insofar as the first stage is con-
cerned, and focuses its attention on the second stage. The court, in other words, is ready 
to recognise an infringement of constitutional right even when it is patently clear that 
the infringement is justified, and marginal when compared to the beneficial objective 
84 HCJ 8397/06 Wasser v Minister of  Defence 62(2) PD 198 [2007] para 8 (in Hebrew).
85 HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v Government of  Israel 58(5) PD 807 [2004] (in Hebrew); HCJ 
7957/04 Mara’abe v Prime Minister of  Israel 60(2) PD 477 [2005] (in Hebrew).
86 S Arieli and M Sfard, The Wall of  Folly (Tel-Aviv, Yedi’ot Sfarim, 2008) 225.
87 HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center of  Law and Business v Minister of  Finance (19 November 2009), Nevo 
Legal Database (by subscription) (in Hebrew).
88 B Arad, The Cost of  Judicial Activism (Jerusalem, Jerusalem Center for Market Research, 2010).
89 CA 4243/08 Dan Area Revenue Service v Perry (30 April 2009), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (in 
Hebrew).
90 H Kanna, ‘Tax claims worth billions are swamping the courts’, Calcalist, Tel-Aviv, 29 June 2009 (in Hebrew) 
www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3275640,00.html. The judgment was overturned by statute.
91 HCJ 5578/02 Manor v Minister of  Finance 59(1) PD 729 [2004] (in Hebrew).
92 HCJ 366/03 Commitment to Peace and Social Justice Association v Minister of  Finance 60(3) PD 464 
[2005] (in Hebrew).
93 See Barak-Erez and Gross, ‘Social Citizenship’ (n 37) 250–52.
94 CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd v Migdal Cooperative Village 49(4) PD 221, 428 [1995] (in Hebrew).
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that the law in question achieves.95 The sizable majority of petitions are denied, there-
fore, only after the proportionality of the violation is assessed, along with a cost-benefit 
analysis and an enquiry to see if the objective can be achieved at a lesser harm to the 
right.
The ISC’s analysis in Manor and Commitment to Peace was quite different. Despite 
the significant cut in benefits (in some cases – up to 30 per cent), the Court was unwilling 
to rule that the laws in question infringed the constitutionally recognised (at least in 
rhetoric) right to social security at all.96 We find, then, that while the Court expands its 
understanding of the scope of CP rights and, consequently, the occasions where a viola-
tion is exhibited, its construction of SW rights is much more narrow, and its willingness 
to acknowledge a violation – much more limited.
A very similar path was taken, in a series of cases, by the European Court of Human 
Rights, which struck down claims for subsistence benefits at the preliminary stage. Even 
though the claimant lacked any independent means of support, the Court ruled that the 
claim is ‘manifestly ill-founded’ since it was not clear that there were no alternative sup-
port systems.97 Similarly, the Canadian Supreme Court rejected a claim to equalise gen-
eral assistance benefits to young adults (under 30), stating that there is no legal support 
to the claim that a reduced benefit (one-third) constitutes a substantive constitutional 
harm.98
Finally, an issue that posits the tension rights and money in their pure form has the 
potential to occupy the courts time and time again in the future. The matter, which may 
be termed colloquially as ‘chipping in’, concerns the conditioning of rights on payment. 
Here again we find a very different judicial approach where CP and SW are assessed. 
In the case of Fordyce County99 the US Supreme Court ruled that the Government 
cannot charge the immediate users of freedom of speech, such as protesters in a public 
park, for the expenses for speech related activities. And in a very similar Israeli case, the 
ISC recognised the police’s power to subject a protest license to certain conditions that 
are relevant to matters of public order, but ruled that ‘setting a price for the implementa-
tion of a right means violating the rights of those who cannot afford it’.100 But this senti-
ment is somewhat more attenuated when SW issues are concerned. 
As emerges from Eva Brems’s portrayal of several copayment cases in Europe, the 
courts are unwilling to allow even a preliminary judicial review of the position that sub-
stantial copayments violate the right to health and to equality.101 Similarly, in Israel, a 
woman who required surgery so as not to lose her hearing was asked to pay 70 per cent 
of the cost.102 Being a teacher and a single parent, she could not afford the ‘bill’, and 
95 HCJ 9333/03 Kaniel v Government of  Israel (16 May 2005), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (in 
Hebrew) (any new tax infringes on the right to property); HCJ 5026/04 Design 22 Shark Deluxe Furniture Ltd 
v Rosenzweig 60(1) PD 38 [2005] (in Hebrew) (law dictating a mandatory day of rest bears on the constitu-
tional right to freedom of occupation).
96 Commitment to Peace (n 92) para 20.
97 E Brems, ‘Indirect Protection of Social Rights by the European Court of Human Rights’ in Barak-Erez 
and Gross, Exploring Social Rights (n 5) 135, 155–56.
98 Gosselin v Quebec [2002] 4 SCR 429 (Can); P Macklem, ‘Social Rights in Canada’ in Barak-Erez and 
Gross, Exploring Social Rights (n 5) 213, 237–38.
99 Fordyce County, Georgia v Nationalist Movement 505 US 123 (1992).
100 HCJ 2557/05 Majority Camp v Israel Police 62(1) PD 200 [2006] para 16 (in Hebrew).
101 Brems (n 97) 141.
102 HCJ 2974/06 Israeli v Committee for the Expansion of  the Health Basket (11 June 2006), Nevo Legal 
Database (by subscription) para 28 (in Hebrew).
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challenged the onerous copayment requirement. In rhetoric that is strikingly different 
from the one employed in the free speech cases, the ISC stated that when priorities are to 
be set, the judiciary should defer its judgment to professional committees, such as the 
one that deliberated the question in this case.103
In conclusion, it would be worthwhile to refer to Ruth Gavison’s suggestion that the 
Court’s most marked deference to governmental priorities is visible in cases where ‘human 
and social interaction’104 is necessary. Contrariwise, we find that such deference is actually 
most notable in social policy cases where the budgetary requirements are pure and clear. 
VI. HOW DID IT COME TO THIS? RIGHTS AS SOCIAL BARGAINS 
The discussion to this point has shown how objections to SW rights, proven unsuccess-
ful on their own terms, have been transformed to fiscal arguments, and have been 
remarkably triumphant in doing so. Moreover, as the preceding part has shown, this 
resurgence has taken place despite the fact that arguments focused on budgetary matters 
fail to distinguish convincingly between SW matters and traditional rights litigation.
I end this chapter with the suggestion that this specific transformation, and its success, 
is not coincidental. In fact, the fiscal redressing of the arguments against SW rights is 
part of a larger phenomenon, one that has deeper meanings and wider consequences. 
Legal discourse is in the process of restructuring rights as ‘conditional’105 or, in the termi-
nology suggested by Sunstein and Holmes (importantly – in the closing sections of a 
book arguing against fiscal objections to SW rights) – as ‘social bargains’. These are the 
makings of ‘consumer-citizenship’,106 one that is ‘reconceived in terms of consumption 
and participation in markets’.107 The importance of this trend has been noted: if the wel-
fare state was once understood to reflect ‘the subordination of market price to social 
justice, the replacement of the free bargain by the declaration of rights’,108 it is now urged 
that ‘that trajectory has been reversed’.109
What are the jurisprudential consequences of the central role that market discourse 
has captured in policymaking? Borrowing a phrase from a different jurisprudential 
debate, it may be suggested that the fiscal paradigm has the potential to lead to a situa-
tion whereby ‘rights become illusory’ since they would ‘extend only up to the point 
where our actions ceased to make a net contribution to the collective project’.110 
103 For a detailed discussion of the case and its aftermath see Barak-Erez and Gross, ‘Social Citizenship’ 
(n 37) 253–54; A Gross, ‘The Right to Health in an Era of Privatization and Globalization’ in Barak-Erez and 
Gross, Exploring Social Rights (n 5) 289, 323.
104 R Gavison, ‘On the Relationship Between Civil and Political Rights and Social and Economic Rights’ in 
JM Coicaud, MW Doyle and AM Gardner (eds), The Globalization of  Human Rights (United Nations 
University Press, 2003) 23, 37.
105 A Paz-Fuchs, Welfare to Work: Conditional Rights in Social Policy (Oxford, Oxford University Press) 
53–64.
106 N Harris, ‘The Welfare State, Social Security and Social Citizenship Rights’ in N Harris (ed), Social 
Security Law in Context (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000) 3, 27.
107 K Rittich, ‘Social Rights and Social Policy’ in Barak-Erez and Gross, Exploring Social Rights (n 5) 107, 
111; similarly, JP Euben, ‘Walzer’s Obligation’ (1972) 1 Philosophy and Public Affairs 438, 444.
108 TH Marshall, ‘Citizenship and Social Class’ (1963) 115.
109 M Katz, The Price of  Citizenship: Redefining the American Welfare State (Pennsylvania, University of 
Pennsylvania, 2008) 1.
110 N Simmonds, ‘Rights at the Cutting Edge’ in M Kramer, N Simmonds and H Steiner (eds), A Debate 
Over Rights:Philosophical Enquiries (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998) 113, 145.
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Curiously, while the above quote was meant to criticise a dominant theory of rights,111 
it is almost an exact translation of some ISC (and other court) pronouncements dealing 
with SW rights. Thus, in Manor, the Court stated that the objective of ‘healing the mar-
ket’ is ‘important to preserve the social structure, which in turn protects human rights’.112 
With respect to the rights of manpower workers, Court President Barak stated that ‘it is 
worth harming human rights to preserve a social structure that protects human rights’.113 
The relevance to our current discussion is made explicit by the fact that the ISC sup-
ported the above statement with a reference to another case – Kontram v Ministry of 
Treasury114 – which, somewhat surprisingly, ‘is considered an important contribution to 
the emergence of social rights in the [Israeli] Supreme Court’.115 The case involved an 
administrative matter of licensing, quite unrelated to social rights. Zamir J does suggest 
that ‘human rights are, indeed, of supreme importance’.116 But he continues: 
But that is just one role [of the government] . . . In fulfilling our role, each of us must accept 
a system of responsibilities, not only towards other individuals, but also towards society in 
general . . . That is how I perceive the social contract.117
The quote is important, I believe, because the language placing ‘rights besides duties’; 
‘no rights without responsibilities’;118 and rights as ‘social bargains’ or ‘community 
assets’119 forms and informs the judicial manifestation of the social contract version that 
is currently in vogue.120 
In particular, positing rights against general welfare, and rights against social justice, 
allows even those who express support for SW rights to subject them to general interest. 
The following quote, from Court President Barak, is part of that particular agenda: ‘the 
normative status and scope of the right to social security . . . is derived from the nature 
of the economic and social regime that governs a certain society . . . It expresses the eco-
nomic strength of its market’.121 It would seem difficult to offer a better example to sup-
port Simmonds’ warning that rights may end up serving merely as place holders for 
forms of protection, that are ‘balanced against countervailing considerations, so that the 
protections that finally result are the outcome of this calculus of conflicting reasons’.122 
The natural result, per Simmonds and others, is that ‘rights or the interests of the right-
holders would play no strategic role in moral and political affairs’.123 While this proposi-
tion seems somewhat extreme as a general assessment, it has merit insofar as SW rights 
discourse in Israel (and elsewhere) is concerned.
111 I refer to the ‘interest theory of rights’. See, eg J Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality 
of  Law and Politics (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995) 44–55.
112 Manor (n 107) 740. The passage was quoted approvingly in HCJ 4947/03 Be’er Sheva Municipality v 
Government of  Israel (10 May 2006), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) para 11 (in Hebrew) (confirming 
a law abolishing tax benefits to cities in the south of Israel).
113 HCJ 450/97 Tnufa v Minister of  Labour and Welfare 52(2) PD 433, 441 [1998] (in Hebrew).
114 HCJ 164/97 Kontram v Ministry of  Finance 52(1) PD 289 [1998] (in Hebrew).
115 Barak-Erez and Gross, ‘Social Citizenship’ (n 37) 247.
116 Kontram (n 114) 340.
117 ibid.
118 A Giddens, The Third Way and its Critics (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1998) 65–66; A Gewirth, The 
Community of  Rights (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996) 42, 223, 231–35.
119 Holmes and Sunstein (n 10) 217.
120 See, eg Michelman, ‘The Constitution’ (n 6) 26–30.
121 HCJ 494/03 Physicians for Human Rights v Minister of  Finance 59(3) PD 322, 333–34 [2004] (in Hebrew).
122 Simmonds (n 110) 160.
123 J Chan, ‘Raz on Liberal Rights and Common Goods’ (1995) 15 OJLS 15, 29.
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The important point here is the conceptual one. It is expressed in the ISC’s succinct 
statement that, in some cases, ‘where there is no budget, there is no right’.124 It should be 
made clear that the Court does not express the obvious truth that budgetary consider-
ations may limit the implementation of the right. Rather, it suggests that they are, as 
Dennis Davis argues when discussing South African cases, ‘in effect . . . defined in terms 
of availability of resources’.125 He refers to Chaskalson P’s conclusion, according to 
which: ‘access to housing, health care, food, water and social security are dependent 
upon the resources available for such purposes, and that the corresponding rights them-
selves are limited by reason of the lack of resources’.126
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite assertions to the contrary, objections to SW rights have not disappeared. In fact, 
the current divide between SW rights and traditional, CP rights, seems wider than ever. 
The explanation for this curious situation, this chapter argued, lies in the fact that while 
the original objections were found unconvincing on their face, their contemporary ver-
sions capture the sign of the times: the market, consumer–citizenship paradigm. Costs, 
budgets and economic criteria are naturally central to this paradigm and thus re-enforce 
arguments that were on the verge of extinction. But history had a different idea in mind, 
and not for the first time. Over 200 years ago, Jeremy Bentham wrote of the social con-
tract: ‘I was in hope . . . that this chimera had been effectively demolished by Mr Hume. 
I think we hear not so much of it now as formerly’.127 So now, insofar as paradigms sup-
porting social policy are concerned, we hear of little else other than the social contract. 
And as the previous part of this chapter hypothesised, this paradigm, along with its 
derivatives, are playing a role in forming the new challenge for advocates of SW rights.
124 Louzon (n 61) para 16.
125 Davis (n 60) 197; also Gross (n 105) 316; D Davis, P Macklem and G Mundlak, ‘Social Rights, Social 
Citizenship and Transformative Constitutionalism: A Comparative Assessment’ in J Conaghan, M Fischl and 
K Klare (eds), Labour Law in an Era of  Globalization: Transformative Practices and Possibilities (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2002) 511, 523–24.
126 Soobramoney v Minister of  KwaZalu Natal 1997(12) BCLR 1696 (CC) 8, para 11.
127 J Bentham, ‘A Fragment on Government or a Comment on the Commentaries’ in JH Burns and 
HLA Hart (eds), Collected Works of  Jeremy Bentham (London, Athlone Press, 1977) 393, 439.
